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Abstract—A key objective of the smart grid is to improve
reliability of utility services to end users. This requires strength-
ening resilience of distribution networks that lie at the edge
of the grid. However, distribution networks are exposed to
external disturbances such as hurricanes and snow storms
where electricity service to customers is disrupted repeatedly.
External disturbances cause large-scale power failures that are
neither well-understood, nor formulated rigorously, nor studied
systematically. This work studies resilience of power distribution
networks to large-scale disturbances in three aspects. First, a non-
stationary random process is derived to characterize an entire
life cycle of large-scale failure and recovery. Second, resilience
is defined based on the non-stationary random process. Close
form analytical expressions are derived under specific large-
scale failure scenarios. Third, the non-stationary model and the
resilience metric are applied to a real life example of large-
scale disruptions due to Hurricane Ike. Real data on large-scale
failures from an operational network is used to learn time-varying
model parameters and resilience metrics.
Index Terms—Non-stationarity, resilience, non-homogeneous
Poisson process, mixture model, real data
I. INTRODUCTION
Our power grid is a vast interconnected network that delivers
electricity from suppliers to consumers. At the edge of the
grid lies power distribution networks [1]. Power distribution
networks provide medium or low voltages to residence and
organizations, and thus serve a unique role of connecting the
grid to end users.
Distribution networks consist of ”leaf nodes” of the energy
infrastructure and are thus susceptible to external disturbances.
For example, natural disasters repeatedly cause devastating
destructions and service disruptions to distributions networks
[2] [3]. There were 6 major hurricanes and more than 10
snow and ice storms occurred in north America in the past
5 years [4]. Each natural disaster disrupted power services
to more than 500,000 customers for days [4]. Large-scale
power outages are more prevalent and damaging in developing
countries, whose energy demands are rapidly increasing but
power infrastructures are still in development [5].
A fundamental research problem pertaining to the real
problem is the resilience of power distribution to large-scale
external disruptions. Resilience corresponds to the ability of
distribution networks to withstand external disturbances and to
recover rapidly from failures. Up to date, tremendous attention
has been directed to resilience of the core that consists of
major power generation and transmission systems of high
voltages [6] [7] [8]. As an external disturbance often affects
power distribution networks in a wide geo-graphical span, the
service disruptions usually remain local at the edge [9]. The
resilience of the edge, however, is understudied [10]. As the
demand on energy is growing, the edge of the grid is becoming
thicker. For example, a utility provider often serves millions
of customers in America. Damages from external disturbances
on power distribution can thus result in a profound impact to a
large number of users. Hence, the issue of resilience of power
distribution networks is much needed to be investigated.
Empirical studies have been conducted on how to access
damages from large-scale power outages (see [11] and ref-
erence therein). Monitoring systems have been developed
and used in power industry to respond to failures due to
natural disasters (see [12] as an example). These empirical
methods predict the degree of damages, e.g., the maximum
number of outages upon a natural disaster [2], often through
observations and experiences. Quantifiable approaches are
lacking and needed to leverage practical experiences to general
principles on resilience of power distribution [5] [13] [10]. In
other words, resilience, as a concept about an overall power
distribution network, needs to be learned systematically from
real data.
Two research challenges emerge. One is what to learn
from real data. Real data consists of samples on responses
of a distribution network to external disturbances. External
disturbances such as hurricanes often occur suddenly and
unpredictably. The resulting large-scale failure and recovery
at distribution networks thus exhibit random and dynamic
behavior. For example, recovery depends on multiple random
factors such as environmental conditions, available resources
and preparation. Prior work models network failures and
recoveries using finite state Markov processes [14]. These
models belong to the general birth-and-death process [15]
which include randomness but assume stationary failure and
recovery. Non-stationary failure such as a non-homogeneous
Poisson point process is provided in the context of Mt/G/∞
queues [16] [17] with time varying Poisson parameters. Gen-
eral time-dependent infinite-server arrival/service processes are
studied in [18] [19]. However, non-stationary recovery is rarely
included in network resilience. In fact, it is an open issue
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2how to characterize large-scale non-stationary failure and non-
stationary recovery for power distribution networks.
The second challenge is how to define and characterize
resilience for an entire non-stationary life-cycle of failure
and recovery. Prior work provides general discussions that
resilience should include multiple attributes, such as both
failure and recovery [20] [21] [22]. However, most prior works
mainly study resilience in terms of maintaining services, and
thus consider failures only [23]. In fact, recovery is rarely
included in defining resilience of power distribution networks.
It is an open issue how to derive resilience metrics for
characterizing non-stationarity in both failure and recovery.
Hence it is necessary to formulate, from ground up, an
entire life cycle of large-scale failure and recovery. This
can prevent us from choosing a model and/or a learning
approach subjectively. We first develop a problem formulation
of large-scale failures at the finest level of network nodes
based on temporal-spatial stochastic processes. However, as
an individual external disturbance results in one ”snapshot”
of network responses, information (data) from one snapshot is
insufficient to completely specify such temporal-spatial model
[24]. We thus derive temporal models of an entire distribution
network by aggregating spatial variables. The resulting tempo-
ral process models an entire non-stationary life-cycle of large-
scale failures. The model applies to general failure process
that can be dependent and with an arbitrary distribution. Two
distinct recovery-characteristics emerge from our model. One
is infant recovery that reflects the ability to recover rapidly
from failures. The other is aging recovery that corresponds to
prolonged failures. We define the resilience as the probability
of infant recovery for a power distribution network. We then
derive analytical expressions for special cases of failure and
recovery.
The model and the resilience metric are studied in a real
life example of large scale service disruptions of power
distribution. Power failures occurred during a major natural
disaster, Hurricane Ike in 2008. Pertinent resilience parameters
are learned using real data from an operational distribution
network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides background knowledge and an example of large-
scale failures at power distribution networks. Section III devel-
ops a problem formulation of failure-and-recovery processes.
Section IV characterizes non-stationary failure and recovery
individually and jointly; then derives analytical expressions
for special cases of failure and recovery. Section V defines
network resilience based on the non-stationary model. Section
VI learns pertinent resilience parameters using large-scale real
data. Section VII discusses our findings and concludes the
paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND EXAMPLE
A power distribution network is at the edge of the grid from
substations to users. A power distribution network consists
of components including substations, feeders, transformers,
poles, and transmission lines, and meters.
A large number of such devices in a distribution network are
often in the open, and thus susceptible to natural disasters such
Fig. 1. Empirical distribution of failure durations in 3D.
as hurricanes, ice and snow storms. For example, a fallen pole
can cause a short circuit, and other devices to fail subsequently.
An external disturbance such as a hurricane can cause a large
number of failures. The failures interrupt electricity service
to end users. A large-scale external disruption can affect one
or many distribution networks in a wide geo-graphical area.
Failure recovery is often done by dispatching crews to the field.
Promptness of failure recovery thus depends on environmental
constraints, preparedness, and resources.
To gain intuition on an entire life cycle of failure and
recovery, we consider an example of large-scale power failures
occurred during Hurricane Ike. Hurricane Ike had a landfall
in 2008 and affected densely populated areas in Texas and
Louisiana. Figure 1 shows a histogram on failure occurrence
time and duration at an operational distribution network be-
fore, during and after the hurricane. The example provides the
following observations:
(a) Both failure occurrence and recovery are time-varying,
i.e., non-stationary.
(b) Samples on failure occurrence time and duration are not
identically distributed. Instead, recovery time characterized by
failure duration is different for failures occurred at different
time.
This shows that failure occurrence and recovery are statis-
tically dependent, and non-stationary.
III. STOCHASTIC MODEL
We formulate large-scale failure and recovery based on
non-stationary random processes. We begin with the detailed
information on nodal statuses in a distribution network. We
then aggregate the spatial variables of nodes to obtain temporal
evolution of failure and recovery of an entire network.
A. Failure and Recovery Probability
A temporal-spatial random process provides a theoretical
basis for modeling large-scale failures at the finest scale of
3nodes. The temporal variable is time t. The spatial variable is
the location of a node in the grid. Here, nodes can be any com-
ponents in a distribution network such as substations, feeders,
hubs, transformers, transmission lines, and power circuits. A
shorthand notation i is used to specify both the index of node
i and its corresponding location, where i ∈ S = {1, 2, ..., n}
for a power distribution network with n nodes.
Let Xi(t) be the status of the i-th node at time t > 0 for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Xi(t) = 1 if the i-th node is in a failure mode.
Xi(t) = 0 if the node is in normal operation. For a distribution
network, an example of a node failure includes a failed circuit,
a fallen pole, a broken link, and an non-operational substation.
Failures caused by external disturbances exhibit random-
ness. Whether and when a node fails is random. Whether and
when a failed node recovers is also random. Hence, random
processes can be used to characterize failure and recovery for
all nodes in a network.
Given time t > 0, P{Xi(t + τ) = 1} characterizes the
probability that node i is failed in the near future t+ τ , where
τ > 0 is a small time increment. Assume a node changes state,
i.e., from failure to normal and vice versa. Then for the ith
node, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
P{Xi(t+ τ) = 1} − P{Xi(t) = 1}
=P{Xi(t+ τ) = 1, Xi(t) = 0}
− P{Xi(t+ τ) = 0, Xi(t) = 1}.
(1)
Eq.1 provides a model for an individual node in a network.
The model includes Markov temporal dependence and spatial
dependence among nodal statuses. Such a model can be
applied to a heterogeneous grid where nodes experience in
general different failure and recovery processes. There are n
such temporal-spatial equations for n nodes in a distribution
network. The n equations together form a temporal-spatial
model for a network.
B. Temporal Process
When large-scale outages are caused by individual external
disturbances, information available is from ”snapshots” of
temporal spatial network statuses. A snapshot corresponds to
spatial-temporal nodal statuses with respect to one external
disturbance, e.g., one hurricane. As there are usually only a
few such snapshots available, information is insufficient for
specifying a complete temporal spatial model at the node level.
However, spatial variables can be aggregated out from Eq.1,
making the information sufficient for temporal characteristics,
where ∑
i∈S
P{Xi(t+ τ) = 1} −
∑
i∈S
P{Xi(t) = 1}
=
∑
i∈S
P{Xi(t+ τ) = 1, Xi(t) = 0}
−
∑
i∈S
P{Xi(t+ τ) = 0, Xi(t) = 1}.
(2)
Furthermore, the probability can be related to an indicator
function,
P{Xi(t) = 1} = E{I[Xi(t) = 1]}. (3)
Then we can define a temporal process as follows.
Definition: A temporal processes {N(t) ∈ N, t > 0} is a
special case of the temporal-spatial process where the spatial
variables (i’s) are aggregated for all nodes in a network. N(t)
is the number of nodes in failure state at time t,
N(t) =
∑
i∈S
I[Xi(t) = 1], (4)
where I(A) is an indicator function, i.e., I(A) = 1 if event A
occurs, and I(A) = 0 otherwise.
Combining Equations 2, 3, and 4, we have,
E{∆N(t)} =
∑
i∈S
P{Xi(t+ τ) = 1} −
∑
i∈S
P{Xi(t) = 1}, (5)
where ∆N(t) = N(t + τ) − N(t). Hence, an expected
increment of the number of failed nodes in a network equals
to the total change of the aggregated probabilities on nodal
statuses.
An increment ∆N(t) in the total number of nodes in failure
state can result from either newly failed or newly recovered
nodes. To further characterize the temporal process N(t), we
define a failure process and a recovery process respectively.
Definition: Failure and recovery processes: Failure process
{Nf (t) ∈ N, t ≥ 0} is the number of failures occurred up to
time t. Recovery process {Nr(t) ∈ N, t ≥ 0} is the number
of recoveries occurred up to time t.
Assume τ > 0 is sufficiently small so that at most one
failure occurs during (t, t + τ), then an increment on the
number of failures satisfies
E{∆Nf (t)} =
∑
i∈S
P{Xi(t+ τ) = 1, Xi(t) = 0}, (6)
where ∆Nf (t) = Nf (t + τ)} − Nf (t). Similarly, for a
sufficiently small τ , it can be assumed that at most one
recovery occurs during (t, t+ τ). Then,
E{∆Nr(t)} =
∑
i∈S
P{Xi(t+ τ) = 0, Xi(t) = 1}, (7)
where ∆Nr(t) = Nr(t+τ)}−Nr(t). Hence, Eq.2 is simplified
as,
E{∆N(t)} = E{∆Nf (t)} − E{∆Nr(t)}. (8)
Furthermore, we assume at time t0 = 0, N(t) = 0, Nf (t) = 0,
and Nr(t) = 0. Aggregating increments in Eq.8 from 0 to t,
we have,
E{N(t)} = E{Nf (t)} − E{Nr(t)}. (9)
Hence, the expected number of nodes in failure state
equals to the difference between the expected failures and
the expected recoveries. This characterizes how the status of
a distribution network changes from the present to the near
future.
4For practicality, the empirical processes as the sample means
Nˆ(t), Nˆf (t), and Nˆr(t) can be used to estimate the true ex-
pectations E{N(t)}, E{Nf (t)}, and E{Nr(t)}, respectively.
Eq.9 can then be represented by the empirical processes,
Nˆ(t) = Nˆf (t)− Nˆr(t). (10)
The empirical processes and the failure-and-recovery equa-
tion allow learning from field data, which shall be elaborated
in Section VI.
IV. NON-STATIONARY FAILURE AND RECOVERY
We now focus on the temporal processes to derive non-
stationary characteristics on failure and recovery individually
and jointly. We derive close form expressions for special
cases of failure and recovery processes. Our study reveals
pertinent parameters which shall be used to quantify resilience
in Section V.
A. Failure Process
Let λf (t) be the intensity function of the failure process.
λf (t) is the expected number of new failures per unit time at
epoch t, i.e.,
λf (t) = lim
τ→0
E{Nf (t+ τ)−Nf (t)}
τ
. (11)
λf (t) is also referred to as the rate function of the failure
process Nf (t). The larger λf (t) is, the more failures occur in
a unit time duration. Hence, failure rate quantifies the intensity
of failure occurrence. An non-stationary failure process has
a time-varying intensity function λf (t). Assuming a failure
process begins at t = 0, we have
E{Nf (t)} =
∫ t
0
λf (v)dv. (12)
The probability density function f(t) of failure occurrence
time at t can be obtained from λf (t), where
f(t) = lim
→0
E{Nf (t+ )−Nf (t)}
limv→∞Nf (v)
1

=
λf (t)∫∞
0
λf (s)ds
,
(13)
As a special case of a general failure process, λf (t),
as the first moment, can completely determines the failure
process Nf (t). Consider an independent failure process where
the number of failures Nf (t) is a counting process with
independent increment ∆Nf (t). Among many such random
processes, non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) [15]
captures the non-stationary nature of failures in a parametric
form. The parameter is the intensity function, λf (t). The non-
stationarity refers to a common characteristic of large-scale
external disruptions where power failures occur at different
intensity at different time. The definition of a NHPP, applied
to a failure process, is provided below.
Definition [15]: A continuous time counting process
{Nf (t), t ≥ 0} is a Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process with
a time-varying rate function λf (t), t ≥ 0, if Nf (t) satisfies
the following conditions:
• Nf (0) = 0;
• {Nf (t), t > 0} has independent increments;
• P{Nf (t+ τ)−Nf (t) ≥ 2} = o(τ);
• P{Nf (t+ τ)−Nf (t) = 1} = λf (t)τ + o(τ).
In Section VI, we shall show using real data that a failure
process {Nf (t)} from a hurricane follows a NHPP with λf (t)
as the failure rate function.
B. Recovery Process
We now define intensity function λr(t) for a recovery
process. λr(t) is the expected number of new recoveries per
unit time at epoch t,
λr(t) = lim
τ→0
E{Nr(t+ τ)} − E{Nr(t)}
τ
. (14)
λr(t) is also referred to as the rate function of the recovery
process Nr(t).
An non-stationary recovery process has a time-varying
intensity function, i.e., λr(t). Assuming the temporal failure
process begins at t0 = 0, we have
E{Nr(t)} =
∫ t
0
λr(v)dv. (15)
The recovery rate characterizes how rapidly recovery oc-
curs, which is measured by failure duration D. For an non-
stationary recovery process, a failure duration depends on
when a failure occurs as illustrated in Figure 1. Such non-
stationarity of recovery is characterized by g(d|t) which is
a conditional probability density function of failure duration
D given failure time T . For a given threshold d0 > 0, the
conditional probability that a duration is bounded by d0 for
failures occurred around time t is
P{D < d0|t} =
∫ d0
0
g(v|t)dv, (16)
where D is a random failure duration.
When d0 is sufficiently small, this probability characterizes
rapid recovery that occurs shortly after failures. For a given
d0, the larger P{D < d0|t} is, the more dominating the rapid
recovery is. Given desired value of probability P{D < d0|t},
the smaller d0 is, the more dominating the rapid recovery is.
Rapid recovery is referred to as infant recovery. This ter-
minology is borrowed from infant mortality in survivability
analysis [25]. Infant recovery is a desirable characteristic of
the smart grid. In contrast, slow recovery is referred to as
aging recovery in analogous to aging mortality [26]. Infant
and aging recovery can be formally defined as follows.
Definition: Infant and aging recovery: Let d0 > 0 be a
threshold value. If a node remains in failure for a duration
less than d0; a recovery is an infant recovery. Otherwise, the
recovery is aging recovery. Infant recovery is characterized by
P{D < d0|t}. Aging recovery is characterized by P{D >
d0|t}.
5Note here P{D < d0|t} is a function of failure occurrence
time. As we shall show through a real-life example in Section
VI, failures occurred at different time may experience infant
and/or aging recovery of different degrees, showing the non-
stationarity of a recovery process.
C. Joint Failure-and-Recovery Process
A joint failure and recovery process characterizes an entire
life cycle of a failure-and-recovery process (FRP), and repre-
sents the total number of nodes N(t) in failure state at time t
(Eq.4). The expected number of nodes in failure can be written
in terms of rate functions,
E{N(t)} =
∫ t
0
[λf (v)− λr(v)]dv. (17)
Failure-and-recovery process can be viewed as an alternative
form of the birth-and-death process [15]. However, commonly-
used birth-and-death processes have a stationary distribution of
failure duration and assume independence between failure oc-
currence t and failure duration d. Here, these two assumptions
are not needed. This implies that failures occurred at different
time can last different duration. For example, under strong
and sustained hurricane wind, failures that do not happen in
day-to-day operation can occur due to, e.g., falling debris and
power lines. We shall further elaborate this through the real-
life example in Section VI.
A failure process and a recovery process are related by
failure durations. As a special case when failure follows a non-
homogeneous Poisson process, the following theorem shows
that the recovery process is also a non-homogeneous Poisson
process parameterized by recovery rate λr(t). In addition λr(t)
can be expressed by failure rate λf (t) with the help of the
distribution of failure duration g(d|t).
Theorem Assume
(a) Independent failure occurrence {T} obeys a non-
homogeneous Poisson process {Nf (t)} with intensity function
λf (t);
(b) Failure duration {D} follows a conditional probability
density function g(d|t) for d ≥ 0, t ≥ 0.
Then the recovery time {T + D} is drawn from a non-
homogeneous Poisson process {Nr(t)} with recovery intensity
function,
λr(t) =
∫ t
0
λf (s)g(t− s|s)ds. (18)
The proof of the theorem is given in Appendix A.
Hence, if a failure process is non-homogeneous Poisson, our
general formulation of the temporal random process reduces
to a Mt/Gt/∞ queue. Mt indicates time-dependent Poisson
failures. Gt indicates non-stationary distribution of failure
duration. ∞ is for the infinite number of servers for repair;
thus recovery can occur right after failure. Furthermore, when
g(d|t) = g(d) is stationary, λr(t) reduces to the convolution
of the failure rate and service time distribution g(d). The
Mt/Gt/∞ model reduces to Mt/G/∞ queue developed in
[17].
D. Special Cases
We consider two special cases where failure, recovery and
joint processes exhibit simple analytical expressions. These
expressions provide insights to an entire non-stationary life
cycle of failure-and-recovery process under different failure
scenarios.
Case 1: Failure and recovery in day-to-day operation:
When there are no significant external disruptions, power
outages are assumed to occur randomly and sporadically. The
failure intensity remains at a constant level, i.e., λf (t) = λ0,
where λ0 ≥ 0 does not vary with time. The number of failures
Nf (t) thus follows a homogeneous Poisson process in day-
to-day operation. The recovery rate in day-to-day operation
λr,0(t) in Eq.18 reduces to,
λr,0(t) = λ0
∫ t
0
g(t− s|s)ds. (19)
As t → ∞, λr,0(t) → λ0. This suggests that the recovery
process in day-to-day operation is also a homogeneous Poisson
process at a long time horizon. Then the expectation E{N0(t)}
of joint failure-and-recovery process in day-to-day operation
is
E{N0(t)} =
∫ t
0
[λ0 − λr,0(v)]dv. (20)
Case 2: Surging failure during a natural disaster:
Now consider a disaster scenario where failures occur
suddenly and intensely. λf (t) increases from a small value
λ0 to a large value in a short time duration 0 ≤ t < t1. The
failure rate can then be written as,
λf (t) = λm(t)[u(t)− u(t− t1)] + λ0, (21)
where u(t) is the unit step function, maxt λm(t) λ0. This
corresponds to an extreme case when a disaster causes sudden
failures at time 0 and then weakens right after.
λr(t) in Equation 18 becomes,
λr(t) =
∫ min(t,t1)
0
λm(s)g(t− s|s)ds+ λr,0(t). (22)
When t  t1, λr(t) ≈ λ0. Furthermore, when t1 is
sufficiently small, i.e., a surge of failures upon the disaster
only lasts a short time,
λr(t)
.
= λm(0)g(t|0) min{t, t1}u(t) + λr,0(t). (23)
When the peak of surging failures λm(0) λ0, the recovery
rate in Eq.23 is approximately proportional to the surging
failure rate and distribution of recovery time immediately after
the disaster. In the long run, λr(t) reduces to λ0.
Substituting Eq.21 and 23 to Eq.17, we have the expectation
of the failure-and-recovery process in surging failures as,
E{N(t)} .= λm(0)[1−G(t|0)] min{t, t1}+E{N0(t)}, (24)
where G(t|s) = ∫ t
0
g(v|s)dv is the conditional cumulative
density function (cdf) of failure duration given time t.
6Additional characteristics of recovery can further reduce the
above expressions. When infant recovery completely domi-
nates a recovery process, g(d|0) = 0 when d > d0. Hence,
for an impulse-like surge of failures at t = 0, the resulting
recovery from the surge lasts d0 duration, i.e.,
λr(t)
.
= λm(0)g(t|0) min{t, t1}[u(t)− u(t− d0)] + λr,0(t). (25)
Eq.24 in dominating infant recovery becomes,
E{N(t)} .={
λm(0)[1−G(t|0)] min{t, t1}+ E{N0(t)}, 0 ≤ t < d0,
E{N0(t)}, t ≥ d0.
(26)
Here failure duration d0 is assumed to be larger than the
end of failure process t1 to simplify the expression. Eq.25
and Eq.26 show that when a recovery process consists of only
infant recovery, all failures due to disasters recover by d0 after
the failure eruption. After d0 the distribution network resumes
day-to-day operation.
When aging recovery dominates the recovery process,
g(d|0) ≈ 0 for d < d0. This implies that recovery begins with
delay d0 after a surge of failures. The corresponding recovery
rate reduces from Equation 23, where
λr(t)
.
= λm(0)g(t|0) min{t, t1}u(t− d0) + λr,0(t). (27)
Eq.24 in dominating aging recovery becomes,
E{N(t)} .={
λm(0) min{t, t1}+ E{N0(t)}, 0 ≤ t < d0,
λm(0)t1[1−G(t|0)] + E{N0(t)}, t ≥ d0.
(28)
Here we also assume d0 > t1. Eq.28 shows another extreme
case where recovery does not begin until d0 delay from the
failure eruption. Then the failures start to recover slowly.
Hence, aging recovery shows the difficulty in resuming service
to customers, and is thus an undesirable characteristic for the
smart grid.
In the general failure-and-recovery process, recovery begins
as soon as failures occur. During the disaster, the failure pro-
cess dominates and E{N(t)} increases rapidly. Afterwards,
the recovery process dominates. At the large time scale and
when disaster lasts for a short period of time, the overlap
between the failure process and recovery process can be
neglected. Thus the failure-and-recovery process splits into
individual processes, failure and recovery, respectively.
V. RESILIENCE
We now derive network resilience using the pertinent pa-
rameters for an entire life cycle of non-stationary failure and
recovery.
A. Definition
An intuition on how to define resilience results from the
previous section. Resilience should be characterized by viru-
lence of failures λf (t), speed of recovery g(d|t) and threshold
d0. These three parameters determine infant recovery. A distri-
bution network experiences a combination of infant and aging
recovery in general. A network is intuitively more resilient
when exhibiting more infant recovery. Hence we define the
resilience as the probability of infant recovery.
Definition: Resilience: Given a threshold value d0 on failure
duration, the resilience of a power distribution network is
defined as
s(d0) = P{D < d0}. (29)
At a high-level, s(d0) measures the resilience of the grid
from large-scale disruptions, and reflects the ability for a distri-
bution network as a whole to survive large-scale failures. Here
we use P{D < d0} rather than time dependent conditional
probability P{D < d0|t}. This is because resilience, when
viewed as a network-wide quantity, should include an entire
life-cycle of failure and recovery but not depend on specific
time epoch t.
B. Resilience Parameters
Resilience can be expressed explicitly by the three pertinent
parameters as follows,
s(d0) =Et{G(d0|t)}
=
∫
t
P{D < d0|t}f(t)dt
=
∫ ∞
t=0
∫ d0
v=0
g(v|t)f(t)dvdt,
(30)
where G(d0|t) = P{D < d0|t}, and f(t) is the probability
density function of failure time given in Equation 13. Eq.30
results in an alternative expression for resilience. There, s(d0)
is the expected value of the probability of infant recovery
G(d0|t) averaged over the non-stationary failure process. This
expression shows explicitly how resilience is determined by
the three pertinent parameters.
C. Threshold
d0 is one other pertinent parameter that determines the
resilience. For a given value of d0, if infant recovery dom-
inates the recovery process over the entire failure duration,
s(d0)→ 1. If aging recovery dominates the recovery process
over the entire failure process, s(d0) → 0. Thus, a larger
s(d0|t) represents a more resilient power distribution network.
When s(d0) = 0.5, the infant and the aging recovery take
equal weight.
How to determine the value for d0? d0 can result from prac-
tical considerations or customer requirements. For example,
when recovering within 24 hours is regarded as acceptable for
a disaster scenario, d0 = 24 defines infant recovery.
A value for d0 can also be determined more objectively. An
intuition results from the fact that if a network is dominated
by infant recovery, most failure durations are less than d0.
Hence, the slope of s(x) is relatively large for x < d0 and
relatively small for x > d0. This implies that d0 corresponds
to a pertinent change point of the slope of s(x), i.e., a deep
valley in the second derivative d
2
dx2 s(x). This is illustrated in
in Fig.2(a). In contrast, when a network is dominated by aging
recovery, most of the failure durations are larger than d0. Thus
7Fig. 2. Illustration: quantitative method for determining d0.
the slope of s(x) is small for x < d0 and large for x > d0. d0
then corresponds to a positive peak in d
2
dx2 s(x) as illustrated
in Fig.2(b). Hence, d0 is determined by the largest magnitude
of the second derivative of the s(x),
d0 =
{
argminx{ d
2
dx2 s(x)}, s(x) is concave,
argmaxx{ d
2
dx2 s(x)}, s(x) is convex.
(31)
We shall provide an example using real data in Section VI.
VI. LARGE-SCALE OUTAGES DUE TO HURRICANE IKE
We now apply the above framework on non-stationary
failure-recovery processes to a real-life example of large-scale
utility-service disruptions caused by a hurricane. Our focus
is on using real data to learn the three resilience parameters
λf (t), g(d|t) and d0 and then to estimate the resilience of an
operational power distribution network.
A. Real Data and Processing
Hurricane Ike was one of the strongest hurricanes occurred
in 2008. Ike caused large scale power failures, resulting in
more than 2 million customers without electricity, and marked
as the second costliest Atlantic hurricane of all time [27] [28].
Reported by National Hurricane Center [29], the storm
started to cause power outages across the onshore areas in
Louisiana and Texas on September 12, 2008 prior to the
landfall. Ike then made a landfall at Galveston, Texas on
2:10 a.m. Central Daylight Time (CDT), September 13, 2008,
causing strong winds, flooding, and heavy rains across Texas.
The hurricane weakened to a tropical storm at 1:00 p.m.
September 13 and passed Texas by 2:00 a.m. September 14.
Widespread power outages were reported across Louisiana
and Texas starting September 12 [28]. A major utility provider
collected data on power outages from more than ten counties.
Fig. 3. Histogram of failure occurrence times during Hurricane Ike.
The outages include various component failures in a distribu-
tion network such as failed circuits, fallen poles, and non-
operational substations. The raw data set consists of 5152
samples. Each sample consists of the failure occurrence time
(ti) and duration (di) of a component (i) in a distribution
network. The accuracy for time t is a minute. The data set
contains failures occurred from September 12 through 14,
2008.
The 5152 samples on the failure occurrence time are plotted
in Fig.3, where the length of each bin is two hours. There were
significantly more failures occurred from 7 a.m. September
12 to 4 a.m. September 14, during which Hurricane Ike made
the landfall in Texas. There are 2005 samples in this time
period. Those 2005 samples are considered as failures due to
Hurricane Ike.
Furthermore, the data set contains groups of failures that
occurred within a minute. As a minute is the smallest time
scale for each sample, the groups are considered as dependent
failures. Dependent failures are grouped as one failed entity
(i), with a unique failure occurrence time ti and duration
di. After such preprocessing, the resulting data set has 465
failed entities. Two outliers with negative failure duration are
further removed. The remaining 463 failed entities from 7 am
September 12 to 4 am September 14 are referred to as nodes.
D = {ti, di}463i=1 is the data set we use for the rest of the paper.
B. Empirical Failure Process
We now focus on studying the empirical failure process
using data set.
1) Learning failure rate: First, we use the data set to
learn failure rate function λf (t). The empirical rate function
is estimated using a simple moving average [30]: λˆf (t) =
Nˆf (t+τ)−Nˆf (t−τ)
2τ , where τ > 0. The resulting rate function is
overlaid with the samples on the number of failures Nˆf (t) in
Figure 4, where each bin is of duration 1 hour, τ = 5 hours.
8Fig. 4. Histogram of failure occurrence times and the failure rate λf (t)
during Hurricane Ike.
The failure rate function shows a time-varying, i.e., non-
stationary, intensity of new failure occurrence, and can be
described as follows.
• Prior to 7 p.m. September 12, the intensity was low, i.e.,
fewer than 5 new failures occurred per hour. Hence λ0 =
5 where λ0 is considered as the failure rate in day-to-day
operation.
• At 7 p.m. September 12, the intensity increased sharply
first to 25 new failures per hour. In the next 6 hours,
the intensity reached the peak value of nearly 50 new
occurrences per hour. This is consistent to the weather
report [29] that the strong wind about 145 mph and
flooding impacted the onshore areas even prior to the
landfall. The time when the peak occurred coincides with
the landfall at 2:10 a.m 9/13 CDT.
• After staying at the high level for about 12 hours (from 7
p.m. September 12 to 7 a.m. September 13), the intensity
decreased rapidly back to a low level of less than 5 new
failures per hours.
2) Non-Homogeneous Poisson Model: We now consider a
hypothesis H0 that these 463 failure occurrences are governed
by a non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP). We perform
Pearson’s test [31] on hypothesis H0 that the empirical failure
process Nˆf (t) follows a non-homogeneous Poisson Process
(NHPP) with intensity function λˆf (t). The test is on two
aspects: (a) independence of the outages occurred at the large
time scale of minutes, and (b) the sample mean, i.e., the
empirical rate function λˆf (t), is sufficient for characterizing
the failure process.
We divide the time duration from 7 a.m. September 12 to
4 p.m. September 14 into 400 intervals. In each interval, the
number of new failures is compared with the expectation. The
sum of the square errors from all intervals results in a chi-
square statistic. The chi-square statistic is χ2 = 0.79, with a
degree of freedom of 2. Given a confidence level at 95%, a
threshold value is obtained as χ20.05,2 = 5.99, where Pr(χ
2 <
Fig. 5. Quantile-Quantile plot on occurrence time of power outages.
χ20.05,2) = 0.95. The chi-square statistic χ
2 obtained from the
data is below the threshold χ2 < χ20.05,2. Hence hypothesis
H0 is not rejected. The detailed procedure of Pearson’s test is
given in Appendix B.
However, not rejecting H0 is insufficient for accepting the
hypothesis. The goodness of fit of NHPP to the data is further
validated through Quantile-Quantile (QQ) plot given in Figure
5. There, the samples are compared with an non-homogeneous
Poisson process with intensity function λˆf (t). The figure
shows that the non-homogeneous Poisson process with the
learned intensity function indeed exhibits a good fit to the data.
Based on the result from Pearson’s hypothesis testing and the
QQ plot, these 463 power failures occur independently, and
obey a non-homogeneous Poisson distribution.
C. Empirical Recovery Process
We now learn the empirical recovery process characterized
by g(d|t), the conditional probability density function of
failure duration given failure occurrence time. Our objective
here is to identify infant and aging recovery.
1) Data: The 463 samples on the failure durations in our
data set correspond to the failures occurred from 7 a.m.
September 12 to 4 p.m. September 14. These samples result in
a joint empirical distribution gˆ(d, t) depicted in the 3-D Fig.1.
Each bin is of length (initial failure time) of 1 hour and width
(duration) of 4 hours. The height of each bin located at initial
failure time t and failure duration d, represents the number of
failures that occur at t and last for d.
2) Mixture Model: Given failure time t, we select a mixture
model as the probability density function g(d|t) for duration
d > 0,
g(d|t) =
l(t)∑
j=1
ρj(t)gj(d|t), (32)
where l(t) is the number of mixtures at time t, ρj(t) (1 ≤ j ≤
l) is a weighting factor for the jth mixture function gj(d|t),
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g1(d) 1 2 3 P{d < 13|ψ1}
ρ1,j 0.486 0.257 0.257
γ1,j 0.710 14.400 211.830 55.99%
k1,j 1.000 10.533 10.679
g2(d) 1 2 3 4 P{d < 13|ψ2}
ρ2,j 0.321 0.206 0.019 0.454
γ2,j 2.680 7.640 21.220 173.580 47.16%
k2,j 0.370 2.910 46.230 3.090
g3(d) 1 2 3 P{d < 13|ψ3}
ρ3,j 0.143 0.472 0.385
γ3,j 0.530 12.300 135.072 56.89%
k3,j 2.500 15.201 4.424
g4(d) 1 2 P{d < 13|ψ4}
ρ4,j 0.323 0.677
γ4,j 11.041 112.245 29.27%
k4,j 5.310 12.398
g5(d) 1 2 3 P{d < 13|ψ5}
ρ5,j 0.273 0.159 0.568
γ5,j 2.479 21.555 134.053 32..60%
k5,j 0.987 1.702 5.070
and
∑
ρj(t) = 1. All these quantities vary with failure time t
for a non-stationary recovery process.
A mixture model is chosen since its parameters exhibit in-
terpretable physical meaning. A parametric family of Weibull
mixtures is particularly appealing as the parameters correspond
to infant and aging recovery directly [15]. Weibull distributions
have been widely used in survival analysis [26] [25] and
reliability theory [15], but not in characterizing recovery from
large-scale disturbances and resilience parameters. Specifi-
cally, a Weibull distribution is
gj(d|t; γj(t), kj(t)) =
kj(t)
γj(t)
(
d
γj(t)
)kj(t)−1e
−( d
γj(t)
)
kj(t)
, (33)
where d > 0, kj(t) and γj(t) are the shape and scale
parameters respectively. A shape parameter kj(t) is especially
important for determining the type of recovery signified by
a mixture component. The smaller kj(t) is, the faster the
decay rate of gj(d|t), the shorter the failure duration and
thus the faster the recovery. Hence, kj(t) < 1 corresponds
to infant recovery whereas kj(t) > 1 corresponds to aging
recovery. Weighting factor ρj(t) signifies the importance of
a component gj(d|t). For a non-stationary recovery process,
these parameters are varying with failure time t.
3) Learning Mixture Parameters: The parameters of the
mixtures of Weibull distribution are learned from the data.
For simplicity, we use a piecewise homogeneous function
to approximate g(d|t). We divide the failure time into m
intervals. Within an interval ψi, g(d|t ∈ ψi) = gi(d) is
assumed to be a time homogeneous function that does not
vary with failure time t. For different intervals, g(d|t ∈ ψi)’s
have different parameters for non-stationarity, where
g(d|t ∈ ψi) =
li∑
j=1
ρi,jgi,j(d; γi,j , ki,j). (34)
Referring to Fig.1, we divide the time into 5 intervals,
{ψi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, the boundaries of each interval are
depicted by dashed lines in Fig.1.
Fig. 6. Empirical distribution of failure duration corresponding to the failures
occurred in ψ1.
Within each interval, the parameters of the mixture Weibull
distribution are learned through maximum likelihood estima-
tion [32], and shown in Table I. Each mixture represents
one cluster of failure durations. For example, distribution of
durations in ψ1 is depicted in Fig.6, where we observe 3
clusters.
For different intervals, the failure duration exhibits distinct
distribution. For example, ψ1 (7 a.m. September 12 to 7 p.m.
September 12) corresponds to the time before hurricane. In this
interval, the network was not yet impacted by hurricane Ike
and was under day-to-day operation. Most failure durations
were as short as a few hours. ψ2 (7 p.m. September 12 to
3 a.m. September 13) corresponds to the time right before
the landfall and hurricane began to cause large-scale failures.
In this interval, more prolonged failures occur and recovery
became more difficult than day-to-day operation.
D. Overall Failure-and-Recovery Process
We now compare the empirical failure-and-recovery process
{N(t)} with the learned process Nˆ(t). N(t) is obtained by
directly adding up the number of failed nodes from the actual
data. Nˆ(t) is obtained by reconstructing the temporal process
with learned λˆf (t) and λˆr(t) through Eq.17. Fig.7 shows the
comparisons. The dotted Nˆ(t) is obtained with the assumption
that g(d) is stationary over time. The dashed Nˆ(t) is obtained
with the piecewise stationary g(d|t) given in Table I. All
estimated processes are able to capture the trend in the data.
However, the stationary distribution of failure durations g(d)
deviates significantly from the actual sample path N(t). This
shows that the piecewise stationary g(d|t) better approximates
the actual failure-and-recovery process.
E. Resilience
To evaluate resilience, we first calculate the probability of
infant recovery within each interval ψi as shown in Table I.
The resilience curve s(x) is then obtained by averaging these
probabilities over failure time. Fig.8 depicts s(x) together with
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Fig. 7. Comparison between the joint failure-recovery process N(t) from
the data set and the reconstructed process Nˆ(t) using learned parameters.
its second derivative d
2
dx2 s(x). s(x) is a concave function.
Hence, the threshold is obtained as,
d0 = argminx{
d2
dx2
s(x)} ≈ 13. (35)
we compute the resilience
s(13) = Et{G(13|t)} = 0.4722. (36)
Hence, 47.22% of the recoveries occurred within 13 hours
whereas 52.78% occurred later than 13 hours. Such resilience
close to 0.5 reveals the combined nature of infant and aging
recovery in the distribution network. Specifically, s(13) < 0.5
indicates a slight dominance of aging recovery over infant
recovery.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A non-stationary random process has been derived to
model large-scale failure and recovery of a power distribution
network under an external disturbance. The non-stationary
network failure and recovery are characterized by time-varying
failure rate and probability distribution of recovery time. These
two quantities, together with a threshold on recovery time,
define network resilience as the probability of rapid recovery.
Analytical expressions have been derived to characterize the
non-stationary failure and recovery under extreme conditions.
Real data has been obtained from an operational distribution
network for a large-scale external disturbance, Hurricane Ike.
Model parameters of the failure-recovery process have been
estimated through non-stationary learning using the real data.
Pearson’s statistical test is applied to validate the assumptions
of the failure model. The resilience metric has been evaluated,
and shown for the operational network that 47% of 5000+
failures recovered within 13 hours whereas the remaining
prolonged as long as 12 days. This provides a quantitative
measure of the resilience of the distribution network and a
baseline for improvement.
Fig. 8. Resilience curve s(x) of the power network.
How to improve resilience to reduce failures needs to be
further incorporated in the resilience metric. Non-stationary
learning algorithms need to be further developed for on-line
learning of time-varying data.
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APPENDIX A
Proof of Theorem: In order to prove that the recovery
process {Nr(t)} is a Poisson process, we just need to show
the increment of recovery process, i.e., recoveries occurs in
(t, t + τ), is an independent Poisson random variable. Now
consider non-overlapping intervals O1, ..., Ok. We say a failure
is type i, i = 1, ..., k, if it recovers in the interval Oi. The
number of the type i events equals to the number of recoveries
occur in the interval Oi. By Proposition 5.3 in [15], it follows
that the number of recoveries occur in the interval Oi, i.e.,
the increment of recovery process, is an independent Poisson
random variable with mean,
E{recoveries in Oi} =
∫ t
0
λf (s)Pi(s)ds, (37)
where Pi(s) is the probability that a failure is type i. Thus,
we prove that {Nr(t)} is a Poisson process.
Then we compute λr(t) and show the non-homogeneity.
Consider interval (t, t + τ) and a failure occurs at time s,
where s < t. The probability that this failure recovers during
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(t, t+ τ) is G(t+ τ − s|s)−G(t− s|s). Eq.37 becomes,
E{Nr(t+ τ)−Nr(t)}
=
∫ t
0
λf (s)[G(t+ τ − s|s)−G(t− s|s)]ds
=τ
∫ t
0
λf (s)g(t− s|s)ds+ o(τ),
(38)
where G(t+ τ − s|s)−G(t− s|s) = g(t− s|s)τ + o(τ). We
can rewrite Eq.38 as,∫ t
0
λf (s)g(t− s|s)ds = lim
τ→0
E{Nr(t+ τ)−Nr(t)}
τ
. (39)
The right-hand-side is just λr(t) (Eq.14). Hence, the recovery
rate function λr(t) is,
λr(t) =
∫ t
0
λf (s)g(t− s|s)ds. (40)
Due to the non-homogeneity of {Nf (t)}, λf (t) is a time-
varying function, so λr(t) is also time-varying function.
Hence, we show the non-homogeneity of {Nr(t)}, which
completes the proof. 
APPENDIX B
Pearson’s Hypothesis Test: The hypothesis test is based on
a chi-square statistic which compares the failure occurrence
times with their sample mean. The details of testing H0 that
failure occurrence times are drawn from a NHPP {Nf (t)} are
given here.
1. Compute the estimated failure rate λˆf (t). At time t, count
the number of failure occurrences in (t−τ, t+τ), then λˆf (t) =
Nf (t+τ)−Nf (t−τ)
2τ .
2. Divide the failure occurrence times into m intervals.
Count the number of failure occurrences in each interval.
Let ci denote the number of occurrence in interval i, where
i = 1, 2, ...,m. Let k = max ci, i = 1, 2, ...m.
3. Count Oj , which is the observed number of intervals with
j failure occurrences, where j = 0, 1, ..., k.
4. Use the estimated λˆf (t) to compute Ej , which is the
expected number of intervals with j failure occurrences.
Ej =
∑m
i=1
e
λˆsi,ti λˆjsi,ti
j! , where (si, ti) is the ith time interval,
λˆsi,ti =
∫ ti
si
λˆf (t)dt.
5. Compute the sum χ2 =
∑k
j=0
(Oj−Ej)2
Ej
. χ2 is a chi-
square statistic, with degree of freedom dof = k−(number of
independent parameter fitted)−1. Since one parameter λˆf (t)
is fitted, the degree of freedom is k − 2.
6. Given a confidence level, for instance 95%, we obtain
a threshold value χ20.05,dof . The hypothesis H0 is rejected if
χ2 < χ20.05,dof ; otherwise, H0 cannot be rejected.
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